The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance by Grooms, H. H.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 5
1925
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
H. H. Grooms
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Grooms, H. H. (1925) "The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol13/iss2/5
NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The rule which is the subject of this article is most gen-
erally known as "The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance." How-
ever, it has in a number of instances been termed the "Human-
itarian Doctrine" or "The Humanity Rule." Some of the
early cases refer to it as "the rule in Davies v. Mann." Further,
the term "Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance" has been used
in personal injury cases to designate the doctrine of discovered
peril.1 From reading the cases and the decisions in the several
jurisdictions of the United States considerable distinction can
be made between "the doctrine of the last clear chance" and
the "humanitarian doctrine." It is the object of the writer to-
point out this distinction.
The last clear chance rule was first enunciated and affirmed
by the English courts, and is strongly supported in this country.
The origin of the doctrine of last clear chance is generally at-
tributed to the English case of Davies v. Mann.2  The decision
in this case was handed down in 1842. Here the plaintiff left
his donkey fettered on a public highway and the defendant,
driving at an improper pace, injured the donkey, which could
not get out of the way. The judge directed the jury that if the
accident might, notwithstanding the negligence of the plain-
tiff, have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on the
part of the driver of the wagon, the defendant was responsible
and the jury found for the plaintiff. That direction was up-
held by the court. "Although the ass may have been wrong-
fully there, still the defendant was bound to go along the road
at such a pace as would be likely to prevent mischief. Were this
not so, a man might justify driving over goods left on a public
highway, or even over a man lying asleep there, or the pur-
posely running against a carriage on the wrong side of the
road.'*' The principal authority for the rule in the case of
1 Eruger v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 80 Nebr. 490.
2 10 M. & W. 546, 549.
3To this case McClean J. of the Mississippi Supreme Court, has
paid the following tribute: "The groans, ineffably and mournfully sad,
of Davie's dying donkey, have resounded around the earth. The last
lingering gaze from the soft, mild eyes of this docile animal, like the
last parting sunbeams of the softest days in spring, has appealed to
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Davis v. Mann was the opinion in the case of Bridge v. Grand
Junction Railway Company.4
Bouvier, in the way of general definition, says that the
doctrine of the last clear chance is as follows: "It is that the
party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligence of the other party, is considered
responsible for it."
It appears that the doctrine is applied on the broadest
principles of public policy. In many opinions the rule has been
put on the idea of wilfulness, recklessness or wantonness. This
view of it possibly sprang from the proposition that contribu-
tory negligence is never a defense against a wilful or wanton
wrong.5 It is probably from this latter view that we get the
terms "humanitarian doctrine" and " humanity rule." In
the more recent cases, however, the humanitarian rule is no
longer put on the presence of wilfulness or intentional wrong
but is reasoned not from the viewpoint of tender regard for
life and limb, and the doctrine is applied on negligence pure
and simple. The court in Murphy v. Wabash Railroad Co. says,
"This rule of last clear chance is recognized by the court as an
exception to the general rule that the contributory negligence
of the person injured will bar a recovery, without reference to
the degree of negligence on his part."
In Chapin on Torts:6 "It (the last clear chance) is fre-
quently declared to be irreconcilable with or an exception to
the doctrine of contributory negligence, but rightly considered
it is neither. The question is simply whether the plaintiff's
negligence is a remote or proximate cause of the injury." In
Clerk and Lindell on Torts :- "If the defendant could in the
result, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have
avoided the mischief which happened, the plaintiff's negligence
will not excuse the defendant."
and touches the hearts of men. There has girdled the globe a band of
sympathy for Davies' 'immortal' critter. Its ghost, like Banquo's, will
not down at the behest of the people who are charged with inflicting
injuries, nor can its groaning be silenced by the ranting excoriations
of carping critics."
4 3M. & W. 246.
Murphy v. "Wabash 1. R. iCo., 228 ko. 56.
p. 544.
"p. 501.
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In Lambert v. Souther Pacific Railroad Co. :8 "The party
-who has a last clear opportunity to avoid inflicting injury is re-
sponsible if without exercising ordinary care he fails to do so."
It is noticeable in all the cases that the knowledge of dan-
ger on the part of the defendant enters as an element in vary-
ing degrees. In St. Louis Southwestern R. Co.9 the principle
upon which the doctrine of discovered peril is based had no ap-
plication in the absence of actual knowledge on the part of the
person causing the injury of the peril of the iijured person in
time to prevent the injury by the use of means within his reach.
While in Guenther v. St. Louis, etc. B. Co.'0 it is extended
to where the defendant might have discovered the plaintiff's
peril by the exercise of reasonable case; or, as in Buxton v.
Ainsworth," where the defendant might have discovered the
plaintiff's peril by ordinary precaution, or, further still, in
Klockenbrink v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co.,12 where not knowing of
the danger the defendant had sufficient notice to put a prudent
man on the alert.
The most common defense against the application of the
last clear chance doctrine is that of concurring negligence on
the part of the plaintiff. Resorting to-Bouvier again: "If the
plaintiff, by ordinary care, could have avoided the effect of the
negligence of the defendant, he is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, no matter how careless the defendant may have been at
the last or any preceding stage." In Denver City Tramway Co.
v. Cobb,13 the court ruled that the "last clear chance doctrine
did not apply where there was no negligence of the defendant
supervening subsequently to that of the plaintiff, as where his
negligence was continuous and operative down to the moment
of the injury, or where his negligence or position of danger was
not discovered by the defendant in time to avoid the injury."
In Dyerson v. Union Pacific Railway Co.,14 it was adjudged that
the doctrine presupposes that the plaintiff's negligence was not
active, continuing and concurring negligence, continuing up to
the very time of the accident, and concurring therein, but was
3 146 Cal. 231.
942 Okla. 638.
177 Ark. 398.
'1138 Mich. 532.
81 Mo. App. 351, 409.
164 Fed. 41.
1474 Kans. 528.
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remote and antecedent. "To warrant the application there
must have been some new breach of duty on the part of the
defendant subsequent to the plaintiff's negligence." In Erick-
son v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co.,15 the plaintiff who, after notice that
a certain boiler was about to be tested in a reckless manner,
persisted in standing by until it exploded, could not recover.
The court in Green v. Los Angeles Terminal B. Co.,16 in
speaking of the application of the doctrine of last clear chance,
said that it applied in cases where the defendant knowing of the
plaintiff's danger, and further knowing that he could not extri-
cate himself from such danger, fails to do something which it is
in his power to do to avoid the injury, but has no application to
a case where both parties are guilty of concurrent acts of negli-
gence, each of which at the very time when the accident occurs
contributes to it.
The essential elements of the application of the doctrine
according to the Montana Court of Appeals in the case of
Dohmer v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co.Y7 are as follows: 1.
The exposed condition brought about by the negligence of the
plaintiff or the person injured; 2, the actual discovery by the
defendant of the perilous situation of the person or property in
time to avert injury; and 3, the failure of the defendant there-
after to use ordinary care to avert the injury.
The writer having searched diligently through many texts
on negligence, and having at his command the various cases in
which the doctrine of last clear chance and the humanitarian
doctrine are involved is unable to find to a very enlightening de-
gree the exact distinction between these two rules.
As a general proposition it may be said that the doctrine
of last clear chance is much broader than the humanitarian
doctrine. In a majority of the states the former rule is applica-
ble, while some five or six states hold to the latter rule. The hu-
manitarian rule appears to be a strong application of the last
clear chance rule, i. e., much stronger than the general concep-
tion of the last clear chance rule.
In a recent Kentucky case, that of Ross v. Loisville Taxi-
cab and Transfer Co.,18 the decision was to the effect that the
146 Ia. 128.
76 Pac. 719.
"48 Mont. 152.
202 Ky. 828.
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plaintiff could recover under the humanitarian doctrine. Ac-
cording to the decisions handed down by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, the last clear chance doctrine has not been adhered
to in Kentucky. This leads us to note the possible distinction
between the two rules in question. The facts in Ross v. Louis-
ville Taxicab and Transfer Co. are substantially as follows (as
the plaintiff's evidence shows) : Between the hours of nine and
ten o'clock at night the plaintiff was crossing a street about
midway of the block when he was struck by a taxicab operated
by the defendants. Plaintiff's leg was broken and he brought
this suit to recover for his injury. When the plaintiff started
across the street he saw the taxicab approaching from the south
three hundred feet away. Also a motorcycle coming from the
north and over two hundred feet away. The street from curb
to curb was thirty-eight feet wide. The taxicab struck the plain-
tiff when he was over two-thirds of the way across the street.
There was a good arc light in the middle of the square which il-
luminated the street; the lights of the taxicab were burning
brightly and there was nothing to prevent the chauffeur from
seeing the plaintiff, as he was in plain view from the time he
started across. The proof for the defendant is to the effect that
plaintiff came out from behind a car that was parked on Third
street eight or ten feet in front of the taxicab and too close to
it to avoid injury to him after the peril was discovered.
The plaintiff asked the court to qualify the usual instruc-
tions on contributory negligence by adding to it these words:
"Unless you should further believe from the evidence that be-
fore the accident that the chauffeur in charge of the taxicab
saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen, plain-
tiff Ross far enough in front of him that said chauffeur could
have, by the exercise of ordinary care, avoided the injury to
plaintiff, but failed to do so, in which latter event the law is
for the plaintiff and you.will so find."
The court refused to do this and gave the usual contribu-
tory negligence instruction. This was error.
The Court of Appeals said: "The rule is that though the
plaintiff may have been negligentin crossing the street, still
he may recover if after his peril is discovered, or by ordinary
care should be discovered, the driver of the vehicle by ordinary
care may avoid the injury to him." This rule was first laid
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down by the Court of Appeals in 1856. The following cases
substantiate it: L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Lowell;19 Doll v. Louis-
ville Railway Co.,20 and 1. C. B. B. Co. v. Pierce.21
As above mentioned, the doctrine of last clear chance as a
general rule has never prevailed in Kentucky. See L. & N. B.
B. Co. v. Trisler,22 L. & N. B. R. 0o. v. Potts;23 L. & N. R. R.
Co. v. Schmetzer;2 4 L. &, N. R. B. Co. v. Lowe; Kentucky
Indiana Bridge Co. v. Snydor; 25 1. C. B. R. Ca. v. Murphy.20
In the Murphy case, Murphy was walking along the tracks of
the company at a place where a lookout duty existed. The com-
pany was negligent in running its train too rapidly and in fail-
ing to give proper signals after Murphy's presence was dis-
covered, yet it is clear from the opinion if he had looked he
could have seen the train and saved himself, and so far as the
last clear chance doctrine is concerned, it is likely that Murphy,
who recovered in the action, had the last clear chance. In L C.
B. R. Go. v. Flaherty, 27 Flaherty was walking on the track,
could have easily stepped out of danger when the cars were
within a few feet of him, had he seen them, and he had only to
look behind him to discover their approach. It further appears
that no lookout was kept and that his danger could have been
discovered by a proper lookout in time to warn him. In this
action Flaherty recovered.
The last clear chance rule places the responsibility for the
injury on the one who by the 'exercise of ordinary care had the
last opportunity to avoid the injury, with contributory negli-
gence available as a defense against the application of the rule.
The humanitarian doctrine places the responsibility on the de-
fendant, notwithstanding the continuing negligence of the plain-
tiff, if after the peril of the plaintiff is discovered, or by ordi-
nary care should be discovered, the defendant by ordinary care
may avoid the injury. Contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff under the latter rule is limited as a defense.
-118 Ky. 260.
20138 Ky. 486.
175 Ky. 493.
140 Ky. 447, 451.
92 Ky. 31.
2 94 Ky. 424.
- 179 Ky. 18.
26 123 Ky. 787.
* 2 129 S. W. 558.
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Under the humanitarian rule you are responsible when you
injure a person, notwithstanding the contributory negligence
of the injured person, if by the use of ordinary care you could
have avoided injuring said person. Under the last clear chance
you are responsible when you injure a pergon, if you had the
last opportunity to avoid injuring such person and by the use
or ordinary care could have avoided injuring said person.
The last clear chance doctrine is applicable to both the in-
jury to person and property, while the humanitarian doctrine
is applicable only, or almost exclusively, to injury to the per-
son.
H. H. GROOs18.
